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The co-evolution of organizational and network structure:
The role of multilevel mixing and closure mechanisms
Abstract
We present a dynamic multilevel framework for analyzing the mutual de-
pendence of change in interorganizational networks and internal organiza-
tional structure. Change occurring at the former (interorganizational) level
involves decisions to change the portfolio of network ties to external partners.
Change occurring in the latter (intraorganizational) level involves decisions
to change the portfolio of internal activities. We estimate a recently derived
class of stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs) that we adopt and adapt
to specify how decisions to change internal portfolios of activities and external
portfolios of partners are connected by theoretically derived multilevel mecha-
nisms that link organizational and network structures. We show that statisti-
cal models for multilevel networks reproduce with high fidelity the structural
regularities observed in the distribution of: (i) activities within organizations;
(ii) network ties between organizations, and (iii) knowledge available in the
organizational field. We discuss the implications of the study for theory de-
velopment, and for empirical research on interorganizational and other kinds
of multilevel networks.
Keywords: Generalized linear models, Health care organizations; Interorga-
nizational networks, Multilevel networks, Network evolution, Organizational
change, Organizational fields, Social mechanisms, Stochastic actor-oriented
models.
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1 Introduction
One of the most enduring insights of organization theory is the recognition of formal
organizations as hierarchical multilevel social systems (Simon, 1962). Almost by
definition, therefore, building and testing network theories of organizations involve
the development of models for multilevel networks (Brass et al., 2004; Moliterno and
Mahony, 2011; Zappa and Lomi, 2015). This point is particularly salient for studies
of interorganizational fields (Powell et al., 2005) where “each node in a network at a
given level of analysis is itself a network at a lower level of analysis” (Moliterno and
Mahony, 2011, p.444). In this paper we develop further this fundamental insight and
link it to recently derived models for the analysis of multilevel networks (Snijders
et al., 2013).
Understanding the relation between change in internal organizational structure
and change in interorganizational networks involves specifying the multilevel mech-
anisms linking two sub-systems of organizational decisions. The first concerns deci-
sions about the creation and maintenance of portfolios of internal resources (activ-
ities) that organizations accumulate over time through investments in production
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). The second concerns decisions about the
composition of portfolios of partners that organizations construct over time through
investments in networks of relations (Powell et al., 1996). How are these sets of
decisions related, and how do they affect one another over time? Addressing these
questions is central to our understanding of how organizations construct the social
space that they inhabit by reconfiguring, simultaneously, their internal structures
and their networks of external dependence relations (Hollway et al., 2017).
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Building on recently proposed class of stochastic actor-oriented models (SAOMs)
for multiple networks (Snijders et al., 2013), we present statistical models that as-
sist in specifying the dynamic multilevel social mechanisms shaping the co-evolution
of interorganizational networks and internal organizational structures. The mecha-
nisms at the heart of our models are “dynamic” because they generate observable
structural change. They are “multilevel” because they involve change simultane-
ously unfolding at the intra- and interorganizational level. These mechanisms are
“social” because they are defined in terms of relations connecting nodes embedded
in networks of interorganizational relations. Finally, the explanatory processes at
the core of our models are “mechanisms” in the sense of Schelling (1998, pp. 32-33),
because they represent hypotheses about how observed macro-structures may be ex-
plained in terms of patterns of local relations between social agents – organizations
in our case. We focus on the analysis of two main classes of multilevel mechanisms
connecting internal and external processes of organizational and network change.
Building on the original model proposed by Snijders et al. (2013), the first class
of multilevel mechanisms connect changes in the number of internal organizational
activities to changes in the number of network partners. Extending established
single-level network concepts (Newman, 2003), we call this family of mechanisms
multilevel mixing. The second class of multilevel mechanisms connect changes in
the composition of internal organizational activities to changes in the composition
of external networks of partners. Specifying the intuition developed by Easley and
Kleinberg (2010) in their discussion of multi-mode networks, we call this class of
mechanisms multilevel closure. We estimate SAOMs that specify how multilevel
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mixing and closure mechanisms concatenate to shape the joint dynamics of orga-
nizational structures and interorganizational networks. Following best practice in
dynamic network modeling, we adopt computational methods to validate the fitted
model and assess its closeness to the observed multilevel data (Hunter et al., 2008;
Snijders and Steglich, 2015).
To establish the empirical value of our methodological proposal we examine lon-
gitudinal data we have collected on interorganizational networks and internal activi-
ties of health care organizations operating in a small regional community (Stadtfeld
et al., 2016). We selected the field of health care because it illustrates particularly
well how internal organizational design decisions and external partner selection de-
cisions are related (Gittell and Weiss, 2004; Shortell et al., 1993). We reconstruct
interorganizational networks in terms of collaborative patient referral relations con-
necting partner hospitals (Mascia et al., 2017). We define internal organizational
structures in terms of dynamic bipartite (more precisely, 2-mode) networks affil-
iating individual organizations to their internal clinical activities (Conaldi et al.,
2012).
The multilevel network structure that we examine in the empirical part of the
paper is obviously specific to our focus on interorganizational relations where orga-
nizations are seen as network “nodes” with an internal structure that may itself be
represented as a (bipartite) network. It behooves us to clarify at the outset that
our example does not limit in any way the levels of organizational analysis that are
amenable to be examined through the multilevel network model we propose. Teams
and individuals (at a more “micro” level), and markets and organizations (at a
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more “macro” level) are examples of multilevel contexts that would lend themselves
equally well to be examined through the multilevel network lens that we propose in
this paper. In general, once the source of action (the “actor”) has been identified
unambiguously, the model is indifferent to the specific choice of level of analysis.
In the specific context of our study, the source of action is the individual hospital
at the crossroad of two distinct, yet interdependent sets of decisions. The first is
the decision to rely on a partner hospital for help with the resolution to a clinical
problem represented by a patient. The second is the decision to modify its formal
structure by adding or removing formal sub-units responsible for specific clinical
activities. These two sets of decisions are not independent because the capacity of
an hospital to provide efficient and high quality care to patients depends on how
these decisions are coordinated.
Multilevel mixing mechanisms connect the number of external partners (i.e., the
outdegree in the interorganizational network), to the number of internal activities
that hospitals hold in their portfolios (i.e., the outdegree in the affiliation network).
Multilevel closure mechanisms may derive from the preferential tendency of con-
nected hospitals to become more similar by emulating or incorporating the activities
of partners, and/or from the tendency of similar hospitals (i.e., hospitals contain-
ing similar internal activities) to become partners. Following Easley and Kleinberg
(2010), we call the former closure mechanism “multilevel membership closure” and
the the latter “multilevel focal closure.” Membership closure involves processes of
social influence whereby connection triggers emulation and diffusion. Focal closure
involves processes of social selection whereby similar organizations are more likely to
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become partners (Steglich et al., 2010). The model we present in this paper allows
us to discriminate between these two alternative sub-processes that may be under-
lying the tendency of interdependent organizations to be (or become) more similar,
i.e., the tendency toward mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 1
We show that a model specified in terms of these various multilevel micro-
mechanisms reproduces with a very high level of fidelity observed macro-regularities
in the: (i) distribution of network ties between organizations; (ii) composition of
activities within organizations, and (iii) diffusion of knowledge within the organiza-
tional community.
2 Motivation and Background
2.1 Connected portfolios
According to Padgett et al. (2003, p.843) “Firms and the core competencies that de-
fine firms are developed and maintained through learning by doing and other learning
processes that are triggered by the exchange among firms.” In this perspective, or-
ganizations are defined by contingent combinations of proprietary internal resources
that are controlled directly, and extramural resources accessible indirectly through
relations with network partners. Internal resources provide the basis of experien-
tial learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). External resources involve a process of
partner selection – i.e, a process of sampling, and learning from, the experience of
others (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Denrell, 2003; Greve, 2005). Portfolios of
1In a different context, Lomi and Stadtfeld (2014) call membership closure “association-based
closure” and focal closure “affiliation-based closure.”
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internal and external resources are connected and mutually dependent. Change in
the composition of one may induce change in the composition of the other. This
happens because change in internal resources provides the basis for new external
dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). At the same time, change in networks of
external partners provides new opportunities for learning, emulation and differenti-
ation that may be achieved through change in internal activities (Stadtfeld et al.,
2016). In more general terms, a distinctive feature of multilevel network systems is
their ability to transmit change across connected levels – regardless of the specific
level at which change action is initiated.
Observed configurations of internal organizational activities are the cumulative
outcome of decisions to invest in productive capacity. Observed interorganizational
configurations are the cumulative outcome of decisions to invest in relations with
external partners. How are these two systems of decisions connected? Addressing
this question requires explicit identification of multilevel dependence mechanisms
linking change in internal organizational structure to change in external networks
with partners.
Existing lines of research on organizational change (Barnett and Carroll, 1995)
and network evolution (Ahuja et al., 2012) have remained surprisingly – but under-
standably – disjoint. We say surprisingly disjoint because the theoretical connection
between internal and external knowledge and organizational resource accumulation
processes is generally acknowledged (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994; Gibbons and Hen-
derson, 2012; Gulati, 1999; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). We say understandably
disjoint because of the lack of a general analytical framework to represent the multi-
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level mechanisms linking organizational and network change (DiMaggio, 1986; Hitt
et al., 2007). Influential statements of multilevel perspectives on organizations and
social networks clearly recognize this problem (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Brass
et al., 2004; Contractor et al., 2006), but offer little guidance about the specific
mechanisms that connect these multiple levels. In this paper, we begin to fill this
gap by proposing one such framework, and testing its empirical value on a realisti-
cally complex empirical case study (Stadtfeld et al., 2016).
As necessary background to our methodological proposal, it may be useful to
recall the fundamental distinction between multilevel network analysis and analy-
sis of multilevel networks recently delineated by Snijders (2016). This distinction
is at the center of the current debate on the analysis of social and other kinds of
networks (Lomi et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2016). Multilevel network analysis in-
volves the combined analysis of social relations within multiple independent groups
(Snijders, 2016) based on models with random coefficients. A recent example of
applied multilevel network analysis is the study by Boda (2018) on social influence
and ethnic identity in multiple classes of high school students. The analysis of mul-
tilevel networks involves the analysis of networks containing different kinds of nodes
linked by different kinds of relations (Lomi et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2013; Snijders,
2016). A recent example of analysis of multilevel networks is the study by Lomi
et al. (2017) on relations among managers and, simultaneously, between managers
and words they use to describe their company.
In the analysis we present in this paper, we adopt a recently developed class of
stochastic actor-oriented models for the analysis of multilevel networks. Interorga-
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nizational relations offer a particularly appropriate setting for illustrating the value
of dynamic multilevel network concepts and models. This is the case because or-
ganizations are network nodes with an internal structure that is differentiated and
changeable (DiMaggio, 1986). When organizational structure changes, the most
fundamental attachment mechanisms such as, for example, homophily and reci-
procity become problematic as the working of these mechanisms depends delicately
on assumptions about the stability of organizational identities (Padgett and Powell,
2012). Under conditions of organizational transformation there is no reason to ex-
pect that attachment mechanisms typically operating in equilibrium will continue
to operate among partners. Change in networks of partners that is likely to ensue,
disrupts patterns of resource dependence that organizations typically manage by
rearranging their internal structure – thus creating the basis for new exchange and
dependence relations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). In studies of interorganizational
networks, this situation provides an almost ideal illustration of this kind of multi-
level change discussed by Kozlowski and Klein (2000). The model that we propose
and illustrate incorporates these coupled multilevel mechanisms of change in the
more general context of stochastic actor-oriented models for dynamic networks.
2.2 Multilevel network mechanisms
Following recent research in the statistical analysis of social networks (Robins et al.,
2009; Snijders, 2016), we focus on multilevel mechanisms that regulate connectivity
and clustering – the major structural features of interorganizational networks (Baum
et al., 2003). The former class of mechanisms control dependencies linking the num-
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ber of internal activities and the number of external partners – or, in other words,
the tendency of organizations with different niche widths to establish various types
of community relations (Barnett and Carroll, 1987). We call these mechanisms mul-
tilevel mixing because they involve degree correlations across levels of observation
(Newman, 2003). The latter class of mechanisms assist with modeling extra-dyadic
dependencies regulating multilevel closure – or the tendency of interdependent or-
ganizations to be similar (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). We call these multilevel
closure mechanisms because their effect is to close open configurations of internal
activities and external network ties (multilevel 2-paths, in network parlance). We
now discuss these various mechanisms more precisely.
2.3 Multilevel mixing
A distinctive feature of social networks is the general tendency of nodes with similar
degrees to associate, typically referred to as ”‘assortative mixing”’ (Newman, 2003).
In the context of interorganizational networks, the number of partners depends, at
least in part, on the composition of the portfolio of internal activities managed by
the organizations involved. This is the case because partner selection depends on
a comparative assessment of compatibilities and complementarities in the internal
portfolios of resources that partners control (Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009). As the
composition of internal activities changes, it is likely that the composition and num-
ber of partner will also change. This may happen, for example, because change
in the composition of internal activities implies change in patterns of niche overlap
within organizational communities and fields (Podolny et al., 1996). In turn, change
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in patterns of niche overlap will determine new conditions for the emergence of com-
petitive and collaborative relations among organizations within the field (Lomi and
Pallotti, 2012).
In what direction causality flows (from change in composition of internal activ-
ities to change in composition of external partners, or vice versa) is an important
issue that we address in the empirical part of the study. Similarly important is es-
tablishing the valence of the degree correlation that multilevel mixing mechanisms
tend to induce. If a larger number of internal activities leads to a larger number
of partners, the multilevel network associating internal and network structure is
assortative. If the contrary holds, the multilevel network is disassortative. Identify-
ing the specific shape assumed by multilevel mixing effects allows us to clarify the
interdependence between internal portfolios of activities end external portfolios of
partners. Figure 1 summarizes this argument.
– Figure 1 about here –
In panel (a) of Figure 1, a narrowly focused organization (i.e., a specialist orga-
nization holding only one activity in its internal portfolio) entertains exchange rela-
tions with many partners. This situation illustrates disassortative multilevel mixing,
or (multilevel) disassortativity – a negative association between degrees of connected
nodes across multiple network levels. In panel (b), a broadly focused organization
(i.e., a generalist organization holding a broad portfolio of internal activities) relies
on many external partners. This situation illustrates assortative multilevel mixing,
or (multilevel) assortativity – a positive association between degrees of connected
nodes across multiple network levels. In Figure 1 the direction of interorganizational
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relations is ignored in the interest of simplicity and clarity. However, the analogous
configurations for directed relations can be derived by representing interorganiza-
tional relations as incoming or outgoing ties. As we will see in the empirical part
of the paper, the mechanism-oriented approach we propose affords identification of
the direction of causality underlying observationally equivalent configurations of ties
produced by different multilevel mixing mechanisms.
2.4 Multilevel closure
The second distinctive structural feature of social networks is clustering – induced
by the preferential tendency of pairs of nodes to be connected if they are both
connected to one or more common third parties (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). An
extensive organizational literature is available that demonstrates the tendency of in-
terorganizational networks to cluster (Baum et al., 2003; Kogut and Walker, 2001)
as a consequence of various path-shortening (or“closure”) strategies (Lomi and Pat-
tison, 2006; Lomi and Pallotti, 2013). Studies of how tendencies toward closure
in interorganizational networks are affected by processes of internal organizational
change, however, are far less common and have started to appear only very recently
(Stadtfeld et al., 2016). This is striking in the light of the fact that one of the main
theoretical propositions inspiring studies of interorganizational networks posits a
multilevel relation linking external dependence relations and internal organizational
structure. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 154) predicted: “The greater the
dependence of an organization on another organization, the more similar it will
become to that organization in structure, climate and behavioral orientation” (em-
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phasis added). This prediction can only be tested by linking external dependence
relations to internal organizational structure, i.e., by developing a multilevel frame-
work.
The empirical propensity of similar organizations to be connected that this pre-
diction implies, may be generated by two very different multilevel closure mecha-
nisms that tend to produce observationally equivalent outcomes. Adopting the ter-
minology established by Easley and Kleinberg (2010) we may call the first mechanism
focal closure – the preferential tendency of similar organizations (organizations shar-
ing the same foci of activity) to establish interorganizational ties to manage their
interdependence. The second multilevel mechanism is membership closure – the
tendency of connected organizations (organizations members in the same dyad) to
become more similar by incorporating the same internal activities held by partners
(Easley and Kleinberg, 2010, pp. 95 – 97). Focal and membership closure impli-
cate very different multi-level mechanisms: The former involves social selection, the
latter social influence (Steglich et al., 2010). Yet, they produce the same (cross
sectional) outcome: similar organizations connected by network ties. Disentangling
focal and membership closure amounts to establishing the relative weight of gen-
eralized processes of influence and selection on the co-evolutionary dynamics of in-
terorganizational networks and organizational structures. Identifying which closure
mechanism is effectively operating is essential to the correct causal understanding of
the institutional process responsible for mimetic isomorphism in interorganizational
fields.
– Figure 2 about here –
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Figure 2 illustrates this point. In panel 1, connected organizations (time T1) be-
come more likely to share an activity (time T2), i.e., become more similar (multilevel
membership closure). In panel 2, organizations sharing an activity (i.e., similar or-
ganizations, time T1) are more likely to become connected (multilevel focal closure,
time T2). As in Figure 1, the direction of interorganizational relations is ignored for
simplicity, but without loss of generality.
3 Stochastic actor-oriented models for multilevel
networks
3.1 Models for multilevel networks
Models for multilevel networks involve explicit connections across levels, and hence
across different classes of actors, or network nodes. According to Lomi et al. (2016,
p. 266), models for multilevel networks include: “Distinct types of nodes defined
at different multiple levels (e.g., individuals and groups) with ties possible between
all nodes, both within and across levels (e.g., distinct types of dyadic ties at the
individual – and the group-level, as well as individual-group affiliations).” Models
for multilevel networks that have proven useful in empirical organizational research
include multilevel exponential random graph models (Zappa and Lomi, 2015; Wang
et al., 2013) and recent extensions of multiple membership multiple classification
models (Tranmer et al., 2016, 2014). These models are typically defined for cross-
sectional data, and hence leave change mechanisms unspecified (Block et al., 2018).
Also, in available models for multilevel networks individual agency plays only an
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implicit role as preferences of individual actors are left implicit.
Like other available models for multilevel networks, stochastic actor-oriented
models (SAOMs) include a bipartite component (a meso-level network) that con-
nects different units across different levels. Unlike available models SAOMs for mul-
tilevel networks are models for change – where change is explicitly represented as
a consequence of individual preferences defined over local configurations of network
ties. We discuss this next.
3.2 Notation and model formulation
Stochastic actor-oriented models are continuous-time models for network panel data
(Snijders et al., 2010). A recent extension allows joint analysis of one-mode and two-
mode networks so that dependence mechanisms within and across networks can be
specified rigorously (Snijders et al., 2013). In the case we examine in the empirical
part of the paper, the one-mode network defines the system of collaborative relations
among organizations. The two-mode network defines the internal organizational
structure in terms of composition of portfolios of activities.
The model may be summarized as follows. Let N = {1, · · · , n} be the set
of nodes, and A = {1, · · · , a} be the set of activities. The one-mode network is
represented by an n× n adjacency matrix X with cell Xij, i, j ∈ N , taking value 1
if there is a tie from i to j and 0 otherwise. The two-mode network is represented
as an n × a adjacency matrix Y with cell Yij, i ∈ N , j ∈ A, being 1 if hospital i
maintains clinical activity j ∈ A and 0 otherwise. In a panel design, the one-mode
and the two-mode networks are observed at M time points t1, · · · , tM . We denote
15
by x(t) and y(t) the observations at time t of the one-mode and two-mode networks,
respectively.
The model assumes that the observed networks are the outcome of a sequence
of unobserved opportunities for tie changes taking place between two consecutive
observations of the networks. Those opportunities are usually referred to as micro-
steps (Steglich et al., 2010). At each micro-step, an actor gets the opportunity to
revise one of its outgoing ties, either in the one-mode or in the two-mode network,
and decides whether to make a change (delete a tie if present and create a tie if
absent) or do nothing. Formally, the model assumes that the observed networks
are the outcome of a continuous-time Markov process, where at randomly occurring
time points one node i faces an opportunity to change either one tie in X or one tie
in Y . The waiting times for an opportunity of a tie change in the one-mode network
X or in the two-mode network Y are described by exponential distributions with
rate parameters λX(x, y) and λY (x, y), respectively. The transition matrix of the
process describes the probability of each possible change, conditional on the node
that has the opportunity to make the change. These probabilities are defined by a
multinomial logit model. Given an opportunity for change in the one-mode network,
the probability that node i changes the tie xij into 1− xij is:
P [i changes xij|Y (t) = y,X(t) = x] = exp(fi(x
ij, y))∑
h∈N
exp(fi(xih, y))
(1)
where xij denotes the network where the change is made in tie xij.
Given an opportunity for change in the two-mode network, the probability that
node i changes the tie yij into 1− yij is:
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P [i changes yij|Y (t) = y,X(t) = x] = exp(gi(x, y
ij))∑
h∈A
exp(gi(x, yih))
(2)
where yij denotes the network where the change takes place in tie yij.
The functions fi(x
ij, y) =
∑
k βksk(x
ij, y) and gi(x, y
ij) =
∑
k γksk(x, y
ij) are
referred to as “evaluation” functions. They are defined as linear combinations of
statistics sk(x
ij, y) and sk(x, y
ij), and parameters βk and γk. The statistics sk(x
ij, y)
and sk(x, y
ij) are counts of network configurations that embody specific hypothesis
on the micro-mechanisms driving the network changes. The statistics sk represent
mechanisms of general theoretical relevance, or contextual empirical importance.
Examples of statistics in the one-mode network are the number of ties and the
number of reciprocal dyads (i.e., pairs of nodes (i, j) with both the ties from i to
j and from j to i present) in which a node i is embedded. Those statistics refer
to the baseline tendency of nodes to establish ties and to the tendency of nodes
to reciprocate existing ties. Examples of statistics in the two-mode network are
the number of ties and the number of four-cycles (i.e., combinations of four ties
connecting nodes i and j with both affiliations a1 and a2) in which a node i is
embedded. Those statistics describe the baseline tendency of nodes to connect to
affiliations and the preferential tendency of nodes sharing an affiliation to get more
affiliations in common. Examples of statistics involving one-mode and two-mode
network ties are discussed in detail in the next section. An overview of the most
common statistics is provided in Table 1 and discussed in Section 4.3.
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3.3 Model interpretation
The parameters βk and γk describe whether the corresponding micro-mechanisms
are relevant to explain the evolution of the networks over time. A positive (negative)
value of a parameter indicates that ties leading to an increase of the correspond-
ing statistic are more (less) likely and therefore provide evidence for (against) the
corresponding micro-mechanism. For instance, a positive value associated to the
reciprocity statistic suggests a preferential tendency to reciprocate existing ties.
One intuitive interpretation of the probabilities in (1) and (2) derives from ran-
dom utility theory (Train, 2009), according to which – given a set of feasible alter-
natives – individuals choose the course of action yielding the highest level of utility.
When nodes get an opportunity for change, they choose the tie in the one-mode (i.e.,
they change the composition of the their portfolios of external partners) or in the
two-mode network (i.e, they change the composition of their portfolios of internal
activities) in a way that is expected to produce the highest level of expected util-
ity. Because network nodes can only change ties under their direct control and are
only interested in the immediate return deriving from the change, actors in SAOMs
are, at best, myopic (or “local”) optimizers (Snijders, 2005). The utility function in
SAOMs is defined as the sum of the evaluation function and a random term which
is assumed to be distributed as a Type I Extreme distribution (Luce and Suppes,
1965; McFadden, 1973) leading to the multinomial probabilities in (1) and (2).
A detailed formulation of the model and the parameter estimation can be found
in Snijders (2001) and Snijders et al. (2013).
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3.4 Model evaluation
Evaluating the fit of an estimated SAOM – and mechanisms-oriented network mod-
els more generally (Snijders and Steglich, 2015) – involves assessing how well the
model is able to reproduce salient characteristics of the observed networks that are
not explicitly modeled (Amati et al., 2018). Statistics associated to these character-
istics are referred to as auxiliary statistics. The most widely used auxiliary statistics
involve characteristics of the indegree and the outdegree distributions. Outdegree
and indegree distributions describe the connectivity of nodes and therefore are con-
stitutive structural features of the network.
Following the approach developed for exponential random graph models by
Hunter et al. (2008), the goodness of fit can be evaluated using continuous-time
simulation of the network co-evolution trajectories from the estimated model. More
specifically, the distribution of the auxiliary statistics is computed given a large
number of simulations based on the estimates. For the model to fit the data well,
the observed value of the statistics should not be extreme in this distribution.
A statistical test for the goodness of fit of SAOMs was recently developed by
Lospinoso (2012), who proposed to use a Monte Carlo test based on Mahalanobis-
distance. The test involves simulating a very large number of co-evolutionary trajec-
tories of the one-mode and two-mode networks, and comparing the average values
of the simulated auxiliary statistics to the corresponding values that are actually
observed. The model fits the data well when the null hypothesis that simulated
and actual values are the same cannot be rejected, i.e., when actual and simulated
values are sufficiently close. Closeness of the observed values and the average of the
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simulated values is measured using the Mahalanobis distance. Formally, let S
∗
be
the vector of auxiliary statistics, s∗ the values observed in the data and ΣS∗ the
covariance matrix of the auxiliary statistics. Then, the test statistic is defined as
D = (S
∗ − s∗)TΣ−1S∗ (S
∗ − s∗) (3)
The empirical cumulative distribution function of D computed using the simulations
is then used as a basis for inference.
4 Empirical illustration
4.1 Setting
We use relational and attributional data collected on all the hospitals operating
within the regional health care system of Abruzzo, a small geographical region in
Central Italy with a resident population of approximately 1.3 million people. The
Italian national health system is a publicly funded health care system providing
universal coverage to all citizens. Through the ministry of health, the national
government controls the distribution of tax revenue for publicly financed health
care, and defines a national minimum statutory benefits package to be offered to all
citizens – the so called essential care. The Italian national health system follows a
federal model with the regions in the country responsible for managing, organizing
and delivering health care services at the local level.
Regional health care systems are internally partitioned into non-overlapping local
health units (LHU) whose mandate is to make health care services generally available
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and accessible across the regional territory. Homogenous coverage is particularly
important for regions like Abruzzo where communities living in mountain areas may
be difficult to reach. The six LHUs in which the region is partitioned, represent
the natural reference markets for hospitals and are of similar size in terms of the
resident population they serve.
Data were made available by the regional health agency. Interorganizational net-
works are reconstructed on the basis of interhospital patient referral flows observed
during the period 2003-2011. Referral relations involve the transfer of patients on
the basis of the decision taken by a hospital (“sender”) to involve a partner hos-
pital (“receiver”) in the collaborative solution of a clinical case. We focus on the
transfer of elective patients (i.e., patients that are not critically ill and hence are not
classified as emergency patients). For this category of patients the sender hospital
may typically choose among multiple potential partners on the basis of a variety
of operational (e.g., available capacity), locational (e.g., proximity), and medical
(e.g., clinical competencies) consideration. In the case of elective patients, relations
between hospitals follow clinical decisions and are activated in the interest of the
patient, rather than following bilateral contractual arrangements. As explained in
Kitts et al. (2017), patient referral decisions are hospital-level decisions with both
clinical as well as economic implications.
For each hospital, the composition of internal portfolio of clinical specialties was
coded as a 2-mode network affiliating hospitals to their internal activities, defined in
terms of organizational units representing specialized pools of clinical and medical
knowledge. Detailed yearly information on organizational attributes was also made
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available.
Thirty-five public and private accredited hospitals were in operation in Abruzzo
during the observation period. This number remained relatively stable over time
with no new hospitals appearing, and five existing small hospitals ceasing opera-
tions since 2009. Clinical specialties represent activities for hospitals – pools of
specialized medical knowledge organized within distinct organizational units. Ex-
amples include cardiology, immunology and neurology. While the distribution of
clinical specialties across hospitals changed (with hospitals adding or dropping spe-
cialties), the aggregate number of clinical specialties available at the regional level
remained stable over time. The set of clinical activities collectively maintained by
hospitals may be understood as the stock of medical knowledge available to the
regional population.
4.2 Data
Figure 3 depicts the one-mode network at the beginning of the observation period
(2003). Red circles represent the hospitals and the ties depict the collaborative
referral relations among them. In Figure 3, the network diagram is superimposed
to the geographical map of the geographical region where the hospitals are located.
Position of the nodes corresponds to the location of the hospitals.
– Figure 3 about here –
Over the period of observation, 385 new collaborative referral relations were
established across all hospitals and 364 existing collaborative referral relations dis-
solved. Stability between consecutive observations for the patient transfer network
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is measured by Jaccard coefficients (Snijders et al., 2010), ranging from 0, if all ties
change, to 1, if all ties remain the same in successive time periods. The stability of
collaborative networks is relatively high as revealed by Jaccard coefficients ranging
between 0.46 and 0.58. The first block of Table A1 summarizes the changes in the
observed one-mode network in more detail.
The two-mode network data specify the internal portfolios of organizational ac-
tivities, i.e., how individual hospitals are associated with the 46 clinical specialties
(or activities) present in the region. The composition of the portfolio of clinical
activities defines the niche of hospital – i.e., the sub-space that it occupies in the
overall space of medical knowledge. Hospitals with wider niches like, for example,
general hospitals, contain many clinical specialties. Because hospital management is
responsible for economic performance, hospitals have at least some discretion over
the composition of their internal portfolio of clinical activities and their internal
organization.
One of example of such hospital is the Ospedali Riuniti SS Annunziata, located
in Chieti, whose internal portfolio included 32 of the 46 clinical specialties present in
the region at the end the last year of observation. Specialist hospitals manage more
restricted portfolios of clinical activities, and occupy, therefore, narrower niches. For
example, the Casa di Cura San Francesco in the city of Vasto specializes exclusively
in physical rehabilitation activities, and provides no other care services. In more
general terms, the internal composition of portfolios of clinical activities determines
how medical knowledge is distributed within the organizational community, and
where it is actually located within the region.
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Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of activities across hospitals at the begin-
ning of the observation period (2003). The blue rectangles represent the clinical
specialties. The width of each rectangle is proportional to the number of hospitals
having that specialty (the “indegrees” of the 2-mode network). Specialties number
15 (general medicine) and 4 (general surgery) are the most popular, i.e., they are
present in almost every hospital in the region. The red rectangles represent the hos-
pitals. The width of each rectangle is proportional to the size of the portfolio of each
hospital (the “outdegrees” in the 2-mode network). The largest hospital in terms of
scope of internal activities is the Ospedale Civile dello Spirito Santo of Pescara (id
code 130018). The stability of the two-mode network is very high as revealed by the
number of newly created (182) and severed ties (160), and by Jaccard coefficients
ranging between 0.81 and 0.96 (Table A1).
Table A1 and Table A2 in Appendix A provide detailed information concerning
network changes and some basic network statistics for both the one-mode and the
two-mode networks.
– Figure 4 about here –
4.3 Empirical model specification
We now provide a brief description of the effects included in the models that we
estimate in the empirical part of the study. We start by considering the effects
associated with change in the one-mode network. The simplest effects are outdegree
and reciprocity. The former describes the propensity of organizations to establish
ties, whereas the latter to reciprocate existing incoming ties. More complex effects
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involve more than two nodes.
Generalized transitivity represents a closure mechanism whereby ties are formed
to close multiple two-paths. In generalized transitivity, organizations tend to create
ties to partners of their partners.
The interaction between reciprocity and generalized transitivity effect captures
the tendency of organizations to form reciprocated ties embedded in transitive con-
figurations of ties – an effect that is typically predicted to be negative (Block, 2015).
The outdegree and indegree centralization effects and the out-in degree assorta-
tivity effect model the outdegree and indegree distributions and their correlation.
Therefore, they model types of preferential attachment mechanisms. More specifi-
cally, they describe the tendency for (i) more active organizations to establish more
ties (outdegree centralization); (ii) organizations to choose more popular organiza-
tions as partners (indegree centralization), and (iii) more active organizations to
choose more popular organizations (out-in degree assortativity).
We introduce now the effects modeling the evolution of the two-mode network.
Baseline effects are the outdegree, modeling the tendency of organizations to own
activities, and the 4-cycle, describing the preferential tendency of organizations to
share multiple activities. Other effects used to capture the outdegree and the in-
degree distributions are: (i) the outdegree truncated at two effect, controlling for
the tendency of organizations to maintain only 1 activity and thus to be specialist
hospitals; (ii) the organizational scope effect, modeling the tendency of generalist
organizations (i.e., organizations holding a large portfolio of activities) to increase
further – or maintain at a high level – the number of specialties they control; (iii)
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the activity diffusion effect modeling the tendency of organizations to have activi-
ties in their portfolio that are also in the portfolio of many other organizations; (iv)
the out-in degree assortativity effect controlling for the tendency of larger generalist
organizations to maintain in their internal portfolios activities that are relatively
common in the community, i.e., activities present in many other hospitals. This
effect also describes a systematic differentiation in the frequency distribution of ac-
tivities in the sense that some activities will be held by many organizations, while
other activities will be held by few; (v) the anti-in-isolates, and the (vi)anti-in-near
isolates effects modeling the tendency of organizations to maintain activities that
are not in the portfolio of any other organization, or are in the portfolio of only one
other organization, respectively. Together, these latter effects are included to con-
trol for features of the data generated by known tendencies of organizations within
a field to become progressively more differentiated over time.
Multilevel mixing and closure are the effects of central interest in the analysis.
The corresponding multilevel mechanisms are represented by statistics in the eval-
uation function of one network that are dependent on the ties in the other network.
The first set of multilevel effects (mixing) describe how the internal structure of the
organizations (ties in the two-mode network) affects interorganizational relations
(ties in the one-mode network). Focal closure is the tendency of hospitals to form
ties with partners having the same clinical activities. The scope on outdegree effect
describes the tendency of generalist organizations to increase the number of refer-
ral partners. In our specific context, the tendency of hospitals with many clinical
specialties to rely on many partner hospitals. The second set of multilevel effects
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(closure) describe how (one-mode) ties in the interorganizational network affect the
internal structure of the organizations (ties in the two-mode network). Membership
closure reprsents the tendency of connected organizations to become more similar
in terms of their internal activities. The outdegree on scope effect describes how
organizations with many interorganizational relations tend to increase the number
of specialties (and hence to become more generalist).
Table 1 summarizes our discussion of the network effects included in the model
by reporting, for each effect, an intuitive graphical representation and a brief verbal
description of the underlying mechanism. We refer readers interested in the math-
ematical definitions of the effects to Table B1 in Appendix B and to Snijders et al.
(2010) and Snijders et al. (2013).
– Table 1 about here –
Obviously, endogenous network mechanisms may not be the only factors affecting
change in interorganizational networks and in the internal structure of organizational
nodes. For this reason, the empirical model specification includes a number of dyadic
and monadic (organization-specific) covariates that prior studies have found to affect
the propensity of organizations to collaborate (Kitts et al., 2017; Stadtfeld et al.,
2016).
Geographical distance is a dyadic covariate measured as the (logarithm of the)
driving time between any two hospitals in the data, and is included to control for
the known tendency of hospitals to refer patients to more proximate partners (other
conditions being equal). Driving time is preferred to physical distance because the
mountain ranges that cover the majority of the regional area make physical distance
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less useful than driving time as a measure of effective distance between organizations.
The remaining organization-specific covariates enter the empirical model speci-
fication as sender, receiver and homophily effects to capture additional factors that
may affect interorganizational collaboration.
Urban location is a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 for hospitals located
in major urban areas and 0 otherwise. Urban location is included to control for
the tendency of hospitals located in rural and in small urban communities to refer
patients to hospitals located in metropolitan areas.
LHU membership is a categorical variable that captures joint membership of hos-
pitals in the different local health units (LHUs) in which the region is partitioned
for administrative purposes. Hospitals in the same LHU are more likely to collabo-
rate because they belong to the same superordinate administrative and managerial
structure.
Institutional form is a categorical variable that records the different institutional
profiles of hospitals in the region. The institutional form of a hospital affects its
governance structure and stated objectives, but it also constrains the activities and
services that may be provided. We identified three alternative institutional forms.
The first involves public hospitals owned directly by the LHU (labeled LHU hospital)
providing secondary care services. The second form contains university polyclinics –
or hospitals that are qualified to render highly specialized (or ”‘tertiary”’) services,
and research activities. The third form includes private accredited hospitals – hospi-
tals controlled by private owners that are eligible to provide secondary care services
under the single payer system. We control for institutional form to account for
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the tendency of hospitals to refer patients to partners with compatible institutional
profiles.
The hospitals’ occupancy rate is included to account for capacity utilization and
for the possibility that interhospital patient flows be affected by differences in avail-
able capacity between partner hospitals. The closer the hospital occupancy rate
is to 1, the closer the hospital is to its full capacity. While certain hospitals can
operate, occasionally, above their full capacity, they cannot do so indefinitely.
It is common for hospitals in public health care systems with a single payer to
receive standard cost-based reimbursements according to DRG (diagnosis-related
grouping) tariffs decided at the national level. Average patient value captures the
average monetary value of resources deployed by hospital to treat their patients,
i.e., the average cost of treatment per discharged patient. The variable is included
to control for the possibility that interhospital patient relations simply reflect dif-
ferences in costs of treatment. A summary and basic descriptive statistics of the
monadic and dyadic covariates is reported in Table A3 in Appendix A.
4.4 Results
The model parameters discussed in this section are estimated by the method of
moments, computed using the stochastic approximation algorithm (Snijders, 2001)
implemented in the R library RSiena (Ripley et al., 2018). To simplify exposition,
in Table 2 we reported only the results of more direct interest to our discussion.
The complete model that includes an additional set of rate parameters, and
the exogenous covariate effects is reported in Table C1 in Appendix C where the
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estimates are briefly discussed.
The template of the R-script that we have adapted to produce the estimates
reported in this section is available at https://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/~snijders/
siena/RscriptSienaBipartite.R.
Table 2 reports the estimates of the parameters in the evaluation functions con-
trolling change in the one-mode and two-mode networks. The table is organized
in blocks of parameters pertaining to conceptually different aspects of the model.
Parameters in block 1M are associated with endogenous mechanisms that shape the
structure of the interorganizational (1-mode) network. Parameters in block 2M of
Table 2 are associated with endogenous mechanisms that regulate processes of inter-
nal organizational change – i.e., change in the two-mode network of organizations-
by-activities. Finally, block ML contains the effects of multilevel mechanisms that
are of central interest.
For simplicity, model parameters are interpreted individually. In network mod-
els this interpretation is partially misleading because (i) many of the effects operate
simultaneously; (ii) the effects are the outcome of social mechanisms that are con-
catenated, and (ii) the parameter estimates depend, in part, on the initial state of
the system that is itself not modeled (Koskinen et al., 2015).
Both in the one-, as well as the two-mode networks the outdegree parameters play
the role of intercepts. Their negative sign reflects the sparsity (low density) of the
corresponding networks. Jointly considered, estimates of endogenous network effect
(reported in block 1M ) provide evidence of preferential tendencies toward reciprocity
(reciprocity) and clustering based on transitive closure (generalized transitivity).
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The negative value of the parameter related to the interaction between reciprocity
and generalized transitivity indicates that the tendency to reciprocate is smaller
between hospitals embedded in transitive triplets. We note that the coefficient for
this interaction effect is smaller in absolute value than both main effects.
Evidence of centralization tendencies based on in- and outdegree is also found
(in- and outdegree centralization). We note a tendency towards disassortativity in
the referral network: hospitals with many partners preferentially select as partners
hospitals with fewer partners (out-in degree assortativity).
The estimates of the network effects on the portfolio of internal organizational
activities are reported in block 2M. The 4-cycle effect suggests a tendency of orga-
nizations sharing a common specialty, to share additional specialties or to maintain
the specialties they both have. In either case, the 4-cycle effect reveals a general
tendency of collaborating hospitals to be, or become, more similar – relational pro-
cesses consistent with processes of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983).
The outdegree truncated at two effect is negative suggesting a positive tendency
toward the maintenance (or creation) of single-specialty hospitals, or – in other
words – a tendency of specialist hospitals to remain specialists.
The positive effect of organizational scope indicates the tendency of larger orga-
nizations to increase their scope and size further or to maintain their larger scope
and size. In other words, generalist hospitals tend to exploit size-based advantages
by maintaining or further expanding their internal portfolio of activities.
The significantly positive activity diffusion effect reveals a tendency of organi-
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zations in the community to conform to the choices of internal activities made by
other organizations. The aggregate effect of these micro-processes is that organiza-
tions in the community tend to become progressively more similar – a conclusion
consistent with institutionalist perspectives on interorganizational communities and
fields (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The negative estimate of the anti in-isolates effect parameter suggests a ten-
dency toward the progressive disappearance from internal organizational portfolios
of activities that are held only by one hospital, i.e., of activities for which demand
in the community is weak.
The negative value of the parameter of the anti in-near-isolates effect reveals
a tendency of organizations in the sample to abandon activities that will then be
held by only one other organization - i.e., to progressively drop from their internal
portfolios clinical activities that are uncommon.
Finally, the tendency against out-in assortativity in the 2-mode network suggests
that hospitals with larger portfolios of activities tend to maintain clinical specialties
that are relatively uncommon in the community.
Estimates associated with the multilevel mechanisms of interest are reported
in block ML at the bottom of the table. Concerning the closure mechanisms, we
note that only focal closure is significant. The corresponding positive coefficient
indicates that hospitals holding similar portfolios of internal activities display a
preferential tendency to develop collaborative relations. Membership closure has no
significant effect: hospitals connected by collaborative patient referral relations do
not necessarily develop similar portfolios of internal activities. Jointly considered,
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the multilevel closure effects suggest a clear dominance of social selection over social
influence processes as closure-generating mechanism in our data.
The multilevel mixing effects are both significant, but in opposite directions.
The positive coefficient of the scope on outdegree effect suggests that hospitals man-
aging larger portfolios of activities tend to increase the size of their network of
partners. In other words, the estimates reveal a tendency toward multilevel as-
sortativity. The negative coefficient of the outdegree on scope effect indicates that
hospitals with fewer partners tend to increase the size of their portfolios of internal
organizational activities. The former multilevel mixing effect suggests that organi-
zations with diversified portfolios of internal activities are more capable of managing
larger networks of partners – an interpretation consistent with “absorptive capac-
ity” arguments (Cohen and Levinthal, 2000). The latter mixing effect suggests that
acquisition of internal resources may be a response to difficulties in finding valuable
exchange partners.
– Table 2 about here –
4.5 Model evaluation
To what extent is the fitted model consistent with the organization and network
structures that were actually observed? To address this question, we simulated a
large number (3000) of one-mode/two-mode co-evolution trajectories, and computed
the value of the auxiliary statistics for each simulated trajectory. We then compare
the statistics computed on the simulated networks with the statistics computed
on the observed network data. The outcome of this comparison is reported in
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Figure 5 which shows the violin plots of the outdegree and indegree distributions of
the one-mode and two-mode networks (Hintze and Nelson, 1998). Each violin plot
depicts the distribution (line around the box-plot), the observed count (red dots),
the average of the simulated value (black dots) and the outliers (black crosses) for
each degree value. The model fits the data well when the distance between red and
black dots is small.
Panels 5a and 5b report the distribution of the outdegree and indegree of the
(one-mode) interhospital network, respectively. In both cases the model reproduces
well the propensity of hospitals to collaborate (panel 5a) and the tendency of hos-
pitals to be selected as partners (panel 5b). The model also reproduces with high
fidelity the distribution of internal clinical activities, i.e. the organizational design
of the hospitals in the community (Panel 5c). Finally, panel 5d shows that the dis-
tribution of medical knowledge in the region is also well captured by the multilevel
model. The p-values associated with the Mahalanobis distance test reported at the
bottom of each panel, demonstrate that the null hypothesis that the simulated net-
works given the estimated model and the observed networks have similar structural
characteristics cannot be rejected.
The post-hoc simulation analysis produced solid evidence that the estimates of
the multilevel model reproduce with considerable accuracy: (i) the internal struc-
ture of the organizational nodes; (ii) the observed structure of the interorganiza-
tional network, and (iii) the distribution of available medical knowledge within the
organizational field. The results of the analysis show that the model is capable
of explaining data observed at very different structural levels. This conclusion is
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strengthened further by the goodness of fit test based on the triad census and the
shortest path length (geodesic distance) auxiliary statistics. As both visual inspec-
tion and the Mahalanobis distance test indicate, the model fits well each one of
the sixteen triadic configurations of network ties observed in the directed hospital
referral network, and almost perfectly the distribution of the shortest path observed
among the organizations in the sample (Figure D1 in Appendix D).
– Figure 5 about here –
5 Discussion and Conclusions
The view of organizations as hierarchical multilevel social systems articulated by
H.A. Simon (1962) continues to inspire contemporary organizational research (Levinthal
and Workiewicz, 2018). A new generation of statistical models for multilevel net-
works is opening new possibilities for exploring and expanding the scope of this
classic view. According to Moliterno and Mahony (2011, p.443): “Given that or-
ganizations are multilevel systems, a network theory of the organization should, by
definition, be multilevel in its scope, considering how networks at one level of the
organizational system influence networks at higher and/or lower levels.” In this
paper we responded to this call to forward multilevel organizational research in the
context of interorganizational networks.
We identified the problem of change as central to our understanding of multilevel
organizational systems. Representing how networks of relations change among so-
cial actors that are themselves changing, remains a prime theoretical and empirical
challenge in our understanding of emergent organizational phenomena (Kozlowski
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et al., 2013; Padgett and Powell, 2012; Powell et al., 2005). Taking on this challenge
requires the development of a new approach to the analysis of multilevel networks
that recognizes change in the internal structure of organizational nodes as both an
antecedent and a consequence of change in the structure of interorganizational net-
works in which organizations are embedded (Moliterno and Mahony, 2011). We
know of no available analytical framework that can be readily adopted to repre-
sent change happening simultaneously within and between organizations. More
specifically, we know of no analytical framework capable of discriminating among
alternative theoretical mechanisms of network change that operate across multiple
levels to shape the co-evolution of organizational and network structure.
In this study, we have proposed and tested a principled analytical framework that
specifies multiple mechanisms coupling change within and between organizations.
According to the model, two sets of multilevel mechanisms couple decisions taking
place at different structural levels. Consistent with assumptions of stochastic actor-
oriented models for network dynamics (Snijders et al., 2010), the first set involves
decisions to change the composition of portfolios of internal organizational activities.
The second set involves decisions to change the composition of portfolios of external
partners.
We presented a realistically complex case study of interorganizational relations in
the field of health care – a field in which internal organizational design decisions are
intimately related to the external resources that organizations can access through
networks of external partners (Gittell and Weiss, 2004; Lomi and Pallotti, 2012).
Our empirical analysis of a regional community of hospital organizations connected
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by collaborative patient referral relations reveals that focal closure dominates mem-
bership closure: organizations with similar portfolios of internal activities are more
likely to collaborate. Collaborating organizations are not more likely than chance
to change their internal structure in the direction of becoming more similar. This
result sheds new light on a major ambiguity latent in studies of interorganizational
fields inspired by institutional theories (DiMaggio, 1986). Our results clearly in-
dicate that the tendency of interdependent organizations in our sample to be (or
become) similar – or mimetic isomorphism – is generated by social selection rather
than social influence, contrary to what the majority of studies about diffusion of
strategies and practices within interorganizational fields typically assume. To the
extent that mimetic isomorphism may be interpreted as a consequence of how or-
ganizations respond to uncertainty (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the results of our
study suggest that organizations in our sample manage uncertainty by establish-
ing network ties with structurally similar partners, rather than imitating current
partners that are partially dissimilar.
The results of the study are obviously specific to the sample of organizations
that we have selected for study. The setting of the study also has a number of
institutional idiosyncrasies. But the model we have presented has broad potential
application both in the study of interpersonal, as well as interorganizational net-
works. Examples of future work that the model might inspire include – but are not
limited to: studies of the co-evolution of social relations and cultural tastes (Lewis
and Kaufman, 2018), friendship choice and employment preference (Kilduff, 1990),
advice networks among managers and words they use to describe their company
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(Lomi et al., 2017). At a more macro level, future studies may find it useful to
examine alternative multilevel closure mechanisms in the context of alliance forma-
tion between companies with complementary or compatible internal resources (Mit-
suhashi and Greve, 2009). Our analysis of multilevel mixing mechanisms reveals new
connections between organizational niche width and positions in interorganizational
networks. This result may open new perspectives for future research on resource
partitioning (Carroll et al., 2002), organizational niches (Podolny et al., 1996), and
for processes of resource transfer from generalist to specialist organizations (Carroll
and Swaminathan, 2000).
More generally, the model for multilevel networks that we have discussed affords
considerable flexibility in the choice of levels of analysis. For example, Lomi and
Stadtfeld (2014) apply it to study the co-evolution of advice ties among MBA stu-
dents and their employment preferences. Fujimoto et al. (2018) adopt it to study
the co-evolution of friendship network and participation in sport activities among
adolescents. Milewicz et al. (2018) adopt the model to examine non-trade agendas
and trade agreements among countries. These works demonstrate the considerable
flexibility of the model that may be applied meaningfully across very different levels
of analysis within - and now also between organizations.
Two main limitations of the study deserve particular mention as they suggest
ways in which future research may improve our understanding of multilevel processes
of change within and between organizations. The first limitation is related to the
fact that the two component decision processes that define the model are observed
during the same time frame. Given a fixed observation window, “slower” decision
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processes will produce fewer observations on change than “faster” decision processes.
How severe this problem might be depends on the “internal time clocks” that reg-
ulate processes of organizational and network change (Amburgey et al., 1993). In
our specific case, for example, the“change rates” estimated from data suggest that
change in the composition in the internal portfolios of activities unfolds at a much
slower rate than change in the composition of portfolios of external partners (see
table C1 in Appendix C). General considerations of organizational inertia make this
result unsurprising (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). But these differences in rates of
change imply that fewer observations are available on organizational change than
on network change – giving rise to difficulties due to differences in statistical power
between sub-processes. While we are not aware of obvious solutions to this “multi-
ple clocks” problem in models based on network panel data, we suspect that future
research may produce considerable insight by modeling the change rates directly.
Doing so might lead to a more detailed understanding of the factors that slow or,
as the case may be, accelerate organizational and network change.
The second limitation inheres in the way we have represented organizational
change as a sequence of episodic, discrete changes in the composition of internal
portfolios of activities. But organizational change also involves equally important
higher-frequency micro-level changes in processes, practices and routines that do not
necessarily reflect themselves in observable modifications in the formal composition
of internal organizational activities (March, 1981; Rerup and Feldman, 2011). The
data we have collected do not allow us to say much about these important sources
of organizational change. For similar reasons, the data we have analyzed in this
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paper are probably not appropriate to study process of organizational learning –
another major determinant of organizational change (Levitt and March, 1988). We
suspect that an analysis of continuous processes of internal organizational learning
and change may be better supported by research design that produce continuous
time, event-oriented observations (Amati et al., 2019).
Despite these limitations, the study remains one of the few available that have
specified the co-evolutionary mechanisms coupling change in internal organizational
activities and external network structure, identified the different effects of such mech-
anisms across multiple levels of organizational analysis, and adjudicated their rel-
ative empirical significance. The ability of the model to reproduce the aggregate
field-level structures that are actually observed starting from assumptions about
micro-mechanisms of local dependence operating across levels of analysis, is the
central achievement of the new multilevel network approach that we have proposed.
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Tables
Statistic Representation Description: Preferential tendency
(1M) One-mode effects
Outdegree i
j
to establish referral relations
Reciprocity i j to reciprocate referral relations
Generalized
transitivity
(gwesp)
i
j
... k
to establish relations with partners connected to the
same third parties
Generalized
transitivity
× reciprocity
i
j
... k
to establish reciprocated relations with partners con-
nected to the same third parties
Outdegree
centralization
i
j
of organizations with high out-degrees to increase their
out-degrees further
Indegree
centralization
i j to choose partners with high in-degrees, i.e., popular
partners
Out-in degree
assortativity
i j
of organizations with many partners (i.e., active or-
ganizations) to establish relations with organizations
already chosen as partners by many others (i.e., pop-
ular organizations)
(2M) Two-mode effects
Outdegree i a maintain clinical activities
4-cycle
i a1
ja2 of organization already having one clinical activity in
common to increase the number of clinical activities
in common
Outdegree
truncated at 2
i
to maintain a single internal activity
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Organizational
scope
a i of generalist organizations to increase their scope (i.e.,
to include additional clinical activities)
Activity
diffusion
i a
of clinical activities maintained by many organizations
to be included also in the portfolio of activity of other
organizations
Out-in degree
assortativity
i a
of organizations having more referral partners to main-
tain clinical activities owned by many other organiza-
tions (i.e., popular activities)
Anti-in-isolates i a to have clinical activities that no other organizations
in the community have
Anti-in-near-
isolates
i a
to have a clinical activity held only by another orga-
nization in the community
(ML) Multilevel effects
Multilevel closure:
focal closure
i
j
a
of organizations with the same internal activities (i.e.,
similar organizations) to develop collaborative rela-
tions
Multilevel mixing:
scope on outdegree
i
j of organizations with broader scope (i.e., with larger
internal portfolios of activities) to establish collabora-
tive relations with many partners
Multilevel closure:
membership closure
i
a of connected organizations to develop the same inter-
nal activities (i.e., to become more similar)
Multilevel mixing:
outdegree on scope
i
a of active organization (i.e., organizations with many
partners) to increase their internal scope by adding
activities
Table 1: Statistics modeling the co-evolution of a one-mode and a two-mode network. Red
circles are health care organizations. Blue squares are clinical activities. Black edges depict
referral relations and grey edges denote two-mode relations. Solid edges represent relations
existing at time T1. Dotted edges represent relations that are observed at T2 but not at T1.
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Est. s.e.
(1M) One-mode effects
outdegree −5.826 0.436∗∗∗
reciprocity 1.650 0.294∗∗∗
general transitivity 1.531 0.194∗∗∗
reciprocity × general transitivity −0.701 0.237∗∗
indegree - centralization 0.983 0.130∗∗∗
outdegree - centralization 0.729 0.170∗∗∗
out-in degree assortativity −0.318 0.077∗∗∗
(2M) Two-mode effects
outdegree −7.173 0.901∗∗∗
4-cycle 0.036 0.007∗∗∗
outdegree truncated at 2 −4.013 0.852∗∗∗
organizational scope 2.299 0.398∗∗∗
activity diffusion 1.908 0.316∗∗∗
out-in degree assortativity −0.814 0.162∗∗∗
anti in-isolates −0.927 0.433∗
anti in-near-isolates −1.483 0.412∗∗∗
(ML) Multilevel effects
focal closure 0.042 0.012∗∗∗
scope on outdegree 0.247 0.063∗∗∗
membership closure 0.175 0.127
outdegree on scope −0.568 0.238∗
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 2: Estimated coefficients and corresponding standard errors for the evaluation
functions of the one-mode two-mode co-evolution model. The asterisks represent two-sided
p-values.
54
Figures
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Multilevel mixing mechanisms. (Red) Circles are organizations. (Blue) Squares
are internal activities. Black edges are interorganizational relations. Grey edges are con-
tainment relations linking organizations to their internal activities. In Panel (a), a spe-
cialist organization (with one internal activity) tends to establish network ties with many
exchange partners (multilevel disassortativity). In Panel (b), a generalist organization
(holding a large portfolio of internal activities) tends to establish network ties with many
exchange partners (multilevel assortativity).
Panel 1
i j
A
T1
i j
A
T2
Panel 2
i j
A
T1
i j
A
T2
Figure 2: Multilevel closure mechanisms. (Red) Circles are organizations. (Blue) Squares
are internal activities. Black edges are interorganizational relations. Grey edges are con-
tainment relations linking organizations to their internal activities. In panel 1, organiza-
tions i and j are connected at time T1 and tend to become more similar by sharing activity
A at time T2 (Multilevel membership closure). In panel 2, organizations i and j hold the
same activity A in their internal portfolio at time T1 and tend to become connected at
time T2 (Multilevel focal closure).
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Figure 3: One-mode network for the year 2003. Red circles represent the hospitals and
the ties depict the collaborative referral relations among them. The network diagram is
superimposed to the geographical map of the region where the hospitals are located. Position
of the nodes corresponds to the location of the hospitals.
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Figure 4: Two-mode network for the year 2003. Red and blue rectangles represent the
hospitals and the activities, respectively. Ties indicate which activity belongs to a portfolio
of a hospital. The width of a rectangle is proportional to the number of ties incident to
that rectangle.
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